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Organizational law – a category that includes the law of corporations,
limited liability companies, partnerships and trusts – has two core
functions. First, organizational law supplies a set of contractarian rules,
some of a ﬁduciary character, that provide for the internal governance
or administration of the organization. These are the rules that provide for
the powers and duties of the managers and the rights of the beneﬁcial
owners.
Second, organizational law supplies a set of proprietary rules that
provide for asset partitioning or ring-fencing or entity shielding. These
are the rules that provide for the separation of the property of the
organization from the property of the organization’s managers, beneﬁcial
owners and other insiders. Asset partitioning requires rules of agency to
establish the authority of the managers to bind the organization in
dealings with third parties, and rules of court procedure to establish the
ability of the organization and third parties to sue each other.
Reconciliation of the contractarian governance and proprietary asset
partitioning features of trust law is the theme that ties together the
chapters for this volume by Thomas P. Gallanis and by Rebecca Lee.1
The author thanks Joshua Getzler, Henry Hansmann, Daniel Kleinberger, Reinier Kraakman
and John Langbein for helpful comments and suggestions, and Greg Dihlmann-Malzer,
Ronnie Gosselin and Jeffrey Hughes for excellent research assistance. Portions of this chapter
derive from R. H. Sitkoff, ‘The Economic Structure of Fiduciary Law’ (2011) 91 Boston Univer-
sity Law Review 1039. In accordance with Harvard Law School’s policy on conﬂicts of interest,
the author discloses certain outside activities, one or more of which may relate to the subject
matter of this chapter, at http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/COI/2012_Sitkoff_Robert.html.
1 T. P. Gallanis, ‘The Contribution of Fiduciary Law’, Chapter 16 in this volume; R. Lee,
‘Convergence and Divergence in the Worlds of the Trust: Duties and Liabilities of Trustees
under the Chinese Trust’, Chapter 17 in this volume.
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Gallanis argues for the importance of the governance features of trust
law, chieﬂy trust ﬁduciary law.He frames his argument as a reply to scholars
of organizational law whom he believes have mistakenly emphasized the
signiﬁcance of trust law’s asset partitioning features and unfairly disparaged
the importance of trust ﬁduciary law.Gallanis argues that trustﬁduciary law
is as important as its asset partitioning rules, and that Anglo-American trust
ﬁduciary law provides a suitable template for civilian jurisdictions that are
assimilating the trust concept.
Lee treats the Chinese enactment in 2001 of a systematic law of trusts
as a natural experiment on the nature and function of trusteeship.
Because China follows the civilian tradition of indivisible property own-
ership, the assimilation of Anglo-American trust law into Chinese law
required replicating trust law’s governance and asset partitioning func-
tions without the express bifurcation of legal and beneﬁcial ownership
that is characteristic of the common law trust. Lee’s thesis is that the
Chinese law of trusts therefore provides a window on the essential
characteristics of trusteeship.
The remainder of this essay, a commentary on the Gallanis and Lee
chapters from an American perspective, is organized as follows. Part II
develops further the idea that, the lack of juridical personality notwith-
standing, trust law follows the governance and asset partitioning pattern
of organizational law. Part III comments on the Gallanis essay. Part IV
comments on the Lee essay. Part V concludes. The underlying theme of
this essay is that trust law is not a species of property law or contract law,
but rather is a species of organizational law.
II Trust law as organizational law
The hallmark characteristic of the common law trust is bifurcation: the
trustee holds legal title to the trust property and the beneﬁciaries have the
equitable, or beneﬁcial, interests. Two categories of issues arise from
this splitting of legal and equitable ownership: (1) the powers and duties of
the trustee and the corresponding rights of the beneﬁciarywith respect to the
trust property and against the trustee (governance), and (2) the effect on the
rights of third parties with respect to the trust property versus the personal
property of the trustee (asset partitioning). These issues – governance and
asset partitioning – are together the core domain of organizational law.2
2 See, e.g., R. H. Sitkoff, ‘An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law’ (2004) 89 Cornell Law
Review 621, 624–34.
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A. Fiduciary governance: powers and duties
The underlying purpose of governance rules is to enable an organi-
zation’s managers to act expeditiously on behalf of the organization and
its beneﬁcial owners while minimizing the agency costs arising from the
separation of management and beneﬁcial ownership.3 In the context of
trust governance, the focus is on safeguarding the beneﬁciary’s interest
from mismanagement or misappropriation by the trustee in circumstances
in which the trustee must have discretionary powers of administration.
The traditional but now outmoded governance strategy for protecting the
beneﬁciary’s interests was to negate the agency problem by disempowering
the trustee. Under traditional law, the trustee had no default powers to
engage in market transactions over the trust property. The trustee’s powers
were limited to those granted expressly in the trust instrument. The problem
with this disempowerment strategy is that in protecting the beneﬁciary from
mis- or malfeasance by the trustee, the law also disabled the trustee from
undertaking transactions useful for the beneﬁciary.
As trusts have come increasingly to be funded with liquid ﬁnancial
assets that require alert management in the face of swiftly changing
ﬁnancial markets, modern trust law has come to give the trustee broad
powers to undertake any type of transaction, subject to the trustee’s
ﬁduciary duties.4 Modern law gives the trustee ‘all of the powers over
trust property that a legally competent, unmarried individual has with
respect to individually owned property’.5 However, ‘in deciding whether
and how to exercise the powers of the trusteeship, [the trustee] is subject
to and must act in accordance with the [trustee’s] ﬁduciary duties’.6
What has happened, in other words, is that modern trust law has come
to substitute empowerment subject to ﬁduciary obligation for simple
disempowerment as the preferredmeans for safeguarding the beneﬁciary’s
interests. The settlor need not spell out with speciﬁcity what the trustee
should do in all possible future circumstances, an impossible task given
transaction costs and the settlor’s lack of clairvoyance. Instead, trust law
3 Ibid., 627–48; see also R. H. Sitkoff, ‘The Economic Structure of Fiduciary Law’ (2011) 91
Boston University Law Review 1039, 1040–5.
4 This thematic observation has been sounded most prominently by John Langbein. See J. H.
Langbein, ‘The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts’ (1995) 105 Yale Law Journal 625,
640–3; J. H. Langbein, ‘Rise of the Management Trust’ (October 2004) Trusts & Estates 52.
5 Restatement (Third) of Trusts, 4 vols. (St Paul: American Law Institute, 2003–12),
§85(1)(a); see also Uniform Trust Code §815(a)(2)(A) (2000) [UTC].
6 Restatement (Third) of Trusts, ibid., §86; see also §70, cmts. a, d.
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provides the trustee with expansive default powers of administration, the
trustee’s exercise of which is subject to review ex post for compliance with
the open-ended ﬁduciary duties of loyalty and prudence.7
The ﬁduciary obligation thus minimizes transaction costs.8 Instead of
trying in advance to reduce to writing provisions for every future contin-
gency, the parties need only address expressly those contingencies that
are important and likely enough to warrant the transaction costs of
express provision. For all other contingencies, the ﬁduciary obligation
ﬁlls the gap. A similar evolutionary pattern toward empowerment subject
to ﬁduciary governance is apparent in the modern law of agency, part-
nerships and corporations – all ﬁelds in which the agency problem
arising from incomplete contracting in the separation of management
and beneﬁcial ownership is likewise prominent.
Viewed in this manner, the ﬁduciary governance strategy of modern
law is intuitive. The functional core of ﬁduciary law is deterrence.9 The
ﬁduciary is induced to act in the best interests of the beneﬁciary by the
threat of after-the-fact liability for breach of the ﬁduciary standards of
conduct. The core ﬁduciary duties are the duties of loyalty and prudence
(or care). The duty of loyalty proscribes misappropriation and regulates
conﬂicts of interest by requiring the ﬁduciary to act in the ‘best’ or even
‘sole’ interests of the principal. The duty of prudence or care prescribes
the ﬁduciary’s standard of care by establishing an objective ‘prudence’ or
‘reasonableness’ standard in which the meaning of prudence or reason-
ableness is informed by industry norms and practices.
Although the duties of loyalty and prudence are formulated in terms of
open-ended standards, the normal accretive process of the common law
has produced a rich body of interpretive authority on ﬁduciary matters.
This mass of authority includes not only decades of case law, but also
generations of treatises, restatements and statutory codiﬁcations. Such
authority improves predictability and reduces decision costs by providing
instructive guidance on what the otherwise expansive duties of loyalty
and prudence require of the trustee in particular circumstances.
7 The Restatement characterizes this structure as ‘a basic principle of trust administration’,
namely, that ‘a trustee presumptively has comprehensive powers to manage the trust estate
and otherwise to carry out the terms and purpose of the trust, but that all powers held in
the capacity of trustee must be exercised, or not exercised, in accordance with the trustee’s
ﬁduciary obligations’. Restatement (Third) of Trusts, above, note 5, §70, cmt. a.
8 See Sitkoff, ‘Economic Structure’, above, note 3, 1040–1, 1044.
9 See F. H. Easterbrook and D. R. Fischel, ‘Corporate Control Transactions’ (1982) 91 Yale
Law Journal 698, 702.
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Accumulated experience with recurring, common sets of facts and
circumstances has also led to the development of subsidiary or imple-
menting rules regarding the application of the duties of loyalty or
prudence to those circumstances. The trust law no-further-inquiry rule
(and its proliferating exceptions) is an example of such a rule.10 Other
common examples from across the ﬁduciary ﬁelds are speciﬁc rules on
disclosure, earmarking, record-keeping, competition with the principal,
theft of the principal’s opportunity, and commingling funds.
Operating in tandem, the broad duties of loyalty and prudence plus
the speciﬁc subsidiary rules provide the decision costs advantage of rules
and the error costs advantage of standards.11 The subsidiary or imple-
menting rules simplify application of the ﬁduciary obligation to cases that
fall within their terms. But if the trustee acts in a manner that is inimical
to the beneﬁciary’s interests yet does not fall within one or another
subsidiary rule, the beneﬁciary may still invoke the broad, open-ended
duties of loyalty and prudence.12
Most ﬁduciary obligations are default rules that yield to the contrary
agreement of the parties. This is true not only in trust law but across the
ﬁduciary ﬁelds. The default character of most ﬁduciary rules follows from
the nature of ﬁduciary governance as a system of deterrence meant to
reduce agency costs in circumstances in which the ﬁduciary must have
broad discretion. If the parties specify what the ﬁduciary should do in a
particular contingency, the default ﬁduciary standards of conduct no
longer pertain with respect to that contingency. Even the ﬁduciary duty
of loyalty is subject to modiﬁcation. If the principal gives informed
consent to certain self-dealing by the ﬁduciary, the rationale for the duty
of loyalty’s prophylactic rule against self-dealing falls away. In such
circumstances, the ﬁduciary may engage in the speciﬁed self-dealing,
provided that she acts in good faith and that the transaction is objectively
fair and in the best interests of the principal.13
10 See Restatement (Third) of Trusts, above, note 5, §78, cmts. b–d.
11 See, e.g., L. Kaplow, ‘Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis’ (1992) 42 Duke Law
Journal 557.
12 See Sitkoff, ‘Agency Costs Theory’, above, note 2, 682–3. I have elsewhere characterized
this mode of legal governance as a ‘standard tempered by presumptions’, in comparison
to a ‘rule tempered by exceptions’. J. Dukeminier, R. H. Sitkoff and J. Lindgren, Wills,
Trusts, and Estates, 8th edn (Frederick, MD: Aspen Publishers, 2009), pp. 386–7.
13 See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Trusts, above, note 5, §78, cmts. c–d; Restatement (Third)
of Agency, 2 vols. (St Paul: American Law Institute, 2006), §8.06(1); Principles of Corpor-
ate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations, 2 vols. (St Paul: American Law Institute,
1994), §5.02.
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To be sure, there is a mandatory core to ﬁduciary obligation that
cannot be overridden by agreement. A ﬁduciary may not be authorized
to act in bad faith.14 Even if the principal authorizes self-dealing,
ﬁduciary law provides substantive and procedural safeguards. The ﬁdu-
ciary must always act in good faith and deal fairly with and for the
principal, and the ﬁduciary must apprise the principal of the material
facts in securing the principal’s informed consent to a conﬂicted action
or self-dealing transaction.15 But such mandatory rules are not a serious
impediment to the parties’ reasonable reﬁnement of the ﬁduciary obli-
gation to be applied in their ﬁduciary relationship. Rather the manda-
tory core of ﬁduciary law serves an internal protective or cautionary
function and an external categorization function.
With respect to the internal protective or cautionary function, the
mandatory core insulates ﬁduciary obligations that the law assumes
would not be bargained away by a fully informed, sophisticated principal.
True, in an individual case a particular principal might be fully informed
and have good reason to want to bargain away something from the
mandatory core. But such circumstances are infrequent enough that a
prophylactic (if paternalistic) mandatory rule may be justiﬁed nonethe-
less, at least in the traditional ﬁduciary ﬁelds such as trust and agency, in
which the principal is commonly not sophisticated and fully informed.
With respect to the external categorization function, the mandatory
core addresses the need for clean lines of demarcation across forms of
property holding to minimize third-party information costs and to
protect third-party rights. This standardization function has been much
discussed in the contemporary learning in property theory.16 On this
view, the mandatory core of ﬁduciary law polices the line that differen-
tiates a ﬁduciary relationship on the one hand from a fee simple or other
such arrangement on the other. A person may give property to another
person and authorize the other person to act whimsically with respect to
14 See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Trusts, above, note 5, §78, cmt. c(2); Restatement (Third)
of Agency, above, note 13, §8.06(1)(a), (2)(a); Uniform Power of Attorney Act §114(a)(2)
(2006); UTC §105(b)(2); see also J. H. Langbein, ‘Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts’
(2004) 98 Northwestern University Law Review 1105.
15 See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Trusts, above, note 5, §78, cmt. c(2) (2007); Restatement
(Third) of Agency, above, note 13, §8.06.
16 See H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman, ‘Property, Contract, and Veriﬁcation: The Numerus
Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights’ (2002) 31 Journal of Legal Studies S373;
T. W. Merrill and H. E. Smith, ‘Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property:
The Numerus Clausus Principle’ (2000) 110 Yale Law Journal 1; T. W. Merrill and H. E.
Smith, ‘The Property/Contract Interface’ (2001) 101 Columbia Law Review 773; see also
Sitkoff, ‘Agency Costs Theory’, above, note 2, 643.
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the property. But this mode of transfer is an absolute gift, and this mode
of holding property is fee simple.17
In summary, the purpose of the governance rules of trust law is to
facilitate expeditious management of the trust property while minimizing
the agency costs arising from separating management (the trustee) and
beneﬁcial ownership (the beneﬁciary). To that end, modern law supplies
an expansive set of default powers that enable the trustee ‘to engage in
every conceivable transaction that might wrest market advantage or
enhance the value of trust assets’.18 However, modern law subjects the
trustee’s exercise or non-exercise of those powers to ﬁduciary duties of
loyalty and prudence as well as a set of implementing ﬁduciary sub-rules.
The ﬁduciary obligation consists generally of default rules that are
alterable in the trust instrument, though there is a mandatory core that
serves protective and categorization functions.
B. Asset partitioning: toward entitization
The core function of asset partitioning rules in organizational law is to
separate the personal property and obligations of the organization’s
insiders from the property and obligations of the organization.19 Such
separation reduces monitoring costs and facilitates productive trans-
actions by making the organization itself a transactional party separate
from its managers and beneﬁcial owners. For example, a prospective
17 The Delaware Supreme Court has put the point thus: ‘A trust in which there is no legally
binding obligation on a trustee is a trust in name only and more in the nature of an
absolute estate or fee simple grant of property’: McNeil v. McNeil, 798 A.2d 503, 509
(2002); see also Armitage v. Nurse [1997] 2 All ER 705, [1998] Ch 241, 253 (Millett LJ)
(‘[t]here is an irreducible core of obligations owed by the trustees to the beneﬁciaries and
enforceable by them which is fundamental to the concept of a trust. If the beneﬁciaries
have no rights enforceable against the trustees there are no trusts’).
The categorization, third-party information costs explanation for the mandatory core
is strongest as regards ﬁduciary relationships for which there is no public notice ﬁling
upon creation such as agency and common law trusts. The explanation is weaker as
regards ﬁling entities such as corporations and limited liability companies, because the
public ﬁling that brings the entity into existence also provides notice to third parties of
the existence of the organization. For this reason, and because the parties in such contexts
are more likely to be fully informed and sophisticated, the mandatory core for ﬁling
ﬁduciary entities is both less robust and more contentious than in agency and trust law.
See Sitkoff, ‘Economic Structure’, above, note 3, 1047–8.
18 Langbein, ‘Contractarian Basis’, above, note 4, 641.
19 The seminal exposition is H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman, ‘The Essential Role of
Organizational Law’ (2000) 110 Yale Law Journal 387.
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lender to the organization need examine the ﬁnances of the organiza-
tion only, acting without regard to the solvency of the organization’s
managers or beneﬁcial owners.20 To be effective, asset partitioning also
requires rules of agency to establish the authority of the managers to
bind the organization, and rules of procedure to establish the ability of
the organization and its counterparties to sue each other.21
For an organization that enjoys juridical personality, such as the
corporation, strong asset partitioning is uncomplicated. The organiza-
tion’s property is held in the name of the entity, the insiders’ personal
property is held in the name of each insider, and the parties’ respective
obligations follow accordingly. The fact of the organization and its
separateness from its managers and beneﬁcial owners is easily veriﬁable
in the notice-ﬁling records of the jurisdiction in which the entity was
formed. There was a clean and obvious line between the personal prop-
erty and obligations of Steve Jobs, on the one hand, and the property and
obligations of Apple, the corporation for which he was the chief executive
ofﬁcer, on the other. Each could sue or be sued with regard to the
separate property of each.
For a common law trust, such straightforward asset partitioning
is not possible. Formally a trust is not a freestanding juridical entity
but rather a relationship created by private agreement without a
ﬁling with the state. A trust cannot sue, be sued, hold property or
transact in its own name. Instead, the trustee sues, is sued, holds
property and transacts with respect to trust property in the trustee’s
ﬁduciary capacity as trustee. Both substantive and semantic conse-
quences ensue.
As a substantive matter, because the trustee holds legal title to the
trust property, under traditional law the trustee was personally liable for
the debts and other obligations arising from ownership of the trust
property. The trustee’s personal liability was offset, however, by a right
to indemniﬁcation out of the trust corpus. A plumber who repaired a
broken toilet in a rental building held in trust could recover his fee from
the trustee personally, but the trustee would then indemnify himself for
the expense out of the trust fund. This clumsy and formalistic ritual,
20 Ibid., 399–405.
21 For a clear discussion, see J. Armour, H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman, ‘What is
Corporate Law?’ paras. 1.2.1, 7–8, in R. Kraakman et al. (eds.), The Anatomy of Corporate
Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach, 2nd edn (Oxford University Press, 2009),
pp. 6–9.
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which is codiﬁed in authorities as late as the Second Restatement of
Trusts, published in 1959, served no functional purpose.22
Prevailing American trust law has since been revised to provide that a
creditor of the trustee in the trustee’s ﬁduciary capacity as such recovers
directly from the trust fund without recourse against the trustee’s per-
sonal property.23 Likewise, even though the trustee has legal title to the
trust property, a personal creditor of the trustee has no recourse against
the trust property.24 Accordingly, from the perspective of third parties
(i.e. persons outside of the settlor–trustee–beneﬁciary triangle), modern
law in effect splits the trustee into ‘two distinct legal persons: a natural
person contracting on behalf of himself, and an artiﬁcial person acting on
behalf of the beneﬁciaries’.25
As a semantic matter, Americans have come to reify the trust, referring
to it as if it were an entity (e.g. ‘an agent owes a duty to the trust’26). When
we do so, we are making use of a convenient shorthand for the more
awkward locution of the trustee acting in his ﬁduciary capacity as trustee.27
This simpliﬁcation accords with prevailing American trust doctrine,
which gives the trust relationship strong entity-like asset partitioning.
Becausemodern law sharply separates the property of the trustee personally
from the property of the trust, the contemporary American trust is in
function (though not in juridical form) an entity. Reifying the trust
in expression is an embrace of substantive function over technical form.
Three features of the asset partitioning rules require further elabor-
ation. First, such rules tend to have a mandatory character with respect to
the preservation of third-party rights. Just as the governing organiza-
tional documents of a corporation, limited liability company or
22 See Restatement (Second) of Trusts (St Paul: American Law Institute, 1959), §§244, 261–5;
see also A. W. Scott, W. F. Fratcher, and M. L. Ascher, Scott and Ascher on Trusts, 5th edn
(New York: Aspen Publishers, 2006), §§26.1–26.7.
23 See Restatement (Third) of Trusts, above, note 5, §§105–6 (2012); UTC §1010.
24 See Restatement (Third) of Trusts, above, note 5, §42, cmt. c (2003); UTC §507.
25 Hansmann and Kraakman, ‘Role of Organizational Law’, above, note 19, 416; see also
H. Hansmann and U. Mattei, ‘The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and
Economic Analysis’ (1998) 73 NYU Law Review 434. For a similar discussion rooted in
the concept of a separate patrimony, see G. L. Gretton, ‘Trusts Without Equity’ (2000) 49
International & Comparative Law Quarterly 599, 608–13.
26 Uniform Prudent Investor Act §9(b) (1994); see also Restatement (Third) of Trusts, above,
note 5, §80, cmt. g.
27 This discussion is thus a brief answer to Lionel Smith’s criticism in ‘Mistaking the Trust’
(2010) 40 Hong Kong Law Journal 787, 799–800; see also L. Smith, ‘Trust and Patrimony’
(2008) 38 Revue générale de droit 379.
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partnership could not validly foreclose recovery against the organiza-
tion’s property by a third party in satisfaction of the third party’s
claim against the organization,28 a trust instrument cannot validly fore-
close recovery against trust property by a third party in satisfaction of the
third party’s claims against the trust.29 Regardless of whether an organ-
ization has formal juridical personality, in creating what is in effect an
artiﬁcial person separate from the organization’s insiders, the law
requires this artiﬁcial person to be responsible for claims against it by
third parties.
Second, the effectiveness of the mandatory protection of third-party
rights in the asset partitioning rules is in part dependent on the manda-
tory rules of ﬁduciary governance. Such mandatory rules serve a categor-
ization or standardization function in the numerus clausus sense by
providing notice and clean lines of demarcation across and within types
of property holdings.30 Organizational property, which is always avail-
able to a creditor of the organization unless the creditor waives that
right,31 must be earmarked and administered as such.
Third, unlike ﬁduciary governance, which is in theory (though not
always in fact) replicable by contract, the asset partitioning of organiza-
tional law is categorically not replicable by contract. Persons cannot create
a ring-fenced fund, protecting their personal assets against future claim-
ants, by a web of contracts among themselves without also invoking the
asset partitioning rules of trust or other organizational law. This insight,
which has been developed most extensively by Henry Hansmann and
Reinier Kraakman,32 reﬂects the inability to limit by contract the rights
28 See, e.g., Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act §110(c)(1), (c)(11) (2006);
Uniform Limited Partnership Act §110(b)(1), (b)(13) (2001); Revised Uniform Partner-
ship Act §103(b)(10) (1997). In the words of the ofﬁcial comment to Uniform Limited
Partnership Act §110(b)(13): ‘The partnership agreement is a contract, and this provision
reﬂects a basic notion of contract law – namely, that a contract can directly restrict rights
only of parties to the contract and of persons who derive their rights from the contract’.
29 See UTC §105(b)(11).
30 See above, note 16, and text accompanying.
31 An interesting encroachment on this principle is the rise of the series organization. For an
example, see article 4 of the Uniform Statutory Trust Entity Act (2009).
32 The principal work is Hansmann and Kraakman, ‘Role of Organizational Law’, above
note 19, previewed in H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman, ‘Organizational Law as Asset
Partitioning’ (2000) 44 European Economic Review 807, and applied to trust law in
Hansmann and Mattei, ‘Functions of Trust Law’, above, note 25. See also Armour
et al., ‘What is Corporate Law?’, above, note 21, para. 1.2.1; H. Hansmann, R. Kraakman
and R. Squire, ‘Law and the Rise of the Firm’ (2006) 119 Harvard Law Review 1333;
H. Hansmann, R. Kraakman and R. Squire, ‘The New Business Entities in Evolutionary
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of third parties not privy to the contract. By contrast, because ﬁduciary law
creates rights and imposes duties only on the parties to the ﬁduciary
relationship or their privies, there is no legal impediment to those parties
replicating the applicable ﬁduciary rules by contract. This latter point is
the premise of John Langbein’s argument that, as regards the trustee’s
powers and the role of trust ﬁduciary law in governing the exercise of those
powers, trust law is predominantly contractarian.33
To be sure, ﬁduciary law serves a crucial role in minimizing
transaction costs. Without the ability to absorb an existing set of ﬁdu-
ciary governance rules tailored to the particulars of the agency problem
in the undertaking the parties intend, the parties would need to think up
and then spell out such rules in detail. In some circumstances, the
associated transaction costs would be insuperable, suppressing otherwise
beneﬁcial deals. For those deals in which the transaction costs would
otherwise be insuperable, ﬁduciary law is essential. This transaction costs
minimizing function, in which the state supplies the public good of
standard-form ﬁduciary contracts, has been discussed extensively in
the literature, particularly of corporate law.34 Standard-form ﬁduciary
contracts include agency, partnership, trust, corporation and limited
liability company.
There is, however, a difference in kind between the utility of organiza-
tional law in reducing transaction costs by offering standard-form ﬁdu-
ciary contracts versus the necessity of organizational law to overcome the
limited reach of contract law by offering asset partitioning as against
third parties. Without the ability to absorb the default ﬁduciary govern-
ance rules of organizational law, the question in each prospective deal
would be whether the parties had enough to gain from the deal to
warrant incurring the costs of creating such rules from scratch by
contract. Even if ﬁduciary law is in fact essential in a particular deal,
Perspective’ (2005) University of Illinois Law Review 5; Hansmann and Kraakman,
‘Property, Contract, and Veriﬁcation’, above, note 16. Hansmann and Kraakman previ-
ously questioned the necessity of corporate limited liability in tort. See H. Hansmann and
R. Kraakman, ‘Do the Capital Markets Compel Limited Liability? A Response to Professor
Grundfest’ (1992) 102 Yale Law Journal 427; H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman, ‘A
Procedural Focus on Unlimited Shareholder Liability’ (1992) 106 Harvard Law Review
446; H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman, ‘Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for
Corporate Torts’ (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 1879.
33 See Langbein, ‘Contractarian Basis’, above, note 4.
34 See, e.g., F. H. Easterbrook and D. R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), pp. 34–5; see also L. E. Ribstein,
‘Making Sense of Entity Rationalization’ (2003) 58 Business Lawyer 1023.
438 robert h. sitkoff
ﬁduciary law is not essential as a matter of categorical legal necessity.
There is no legal disability, as opposed to a transaction costs obstacle,
to replicating the rules of trust or other ﬁduciary law by way of an
ordinary contract.
By contrast, the asset partitioning rules of trust and other organiza-
tional law are categorically essential as a matter of legal necessity. The
parties to a prospective deal cannot validly replicate the third-party
effects of organizational law’s asset partitioning rules by way of ordinary
contracts. Without organizational law, one cannot create a ring-fenced
fund of certain property that is enforceable against third parties. It is in
this sense that Hansmann and Kraakman and other scholars of organiza-
tional law speak of the ‘essential role of organizational law’.35 No one
denies the utility of trust law and other species of organizational law as
‘standard-form contracts among the parties who participate in an enter-
prise’.36 Rather, the claim is that the ‘essential’ role of organizational law
is ‘the creation of relationships that could not practicably be formed by
contract alone’.37
In summary, the core function of asset partitioning rules in organ-
izational law is to separate the personal property and obligations of the
organization’s insiders from the property and obligations of the organ-
ization. Such separation reduces monitoring costs and facilitates pro-
ductive transactions by creating a separate counterparty for deals
pertaining to the organization’s property. In the context of trust law,
asset partitioning allows the trustee to deal separately with his personal
creditors and with creditors in respect of trust property.38 Because
prevailing modern American trust law gives creditors of the trust
(i.e. creditors of the trustee in his ﬁduciary capacity as such) direct
recourse against the trust property and no rights against the trustee’s
personal property, the modern American trust is in function (though
not in form) an entity separate from the trustee and the beneﬁciary.
Unlike the rules of ﬁduciary governance, which could in theory be
replicated by contract subject only to the constraint of transaction
costs, the rules of asset partitioning, which reorganize the rights of
third parties to the trust property, could not likewise be replicated by
an ordinary contract owing to the inability of a contract to limit the
rights of non-privies.
35 Hansmann and Kraakman, ‘Role of Organizational Law’, above, note 19.
36 Ibid., 390. 37 Ibid. 38 See Sitkoff, ‘Agency Costs Theory’, above, note 2, 631–3.
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III Gallanis and the contribution of ﬁduciary law
In his chapter in this volume, Thomas Gallanis undertakes to identify
what Anglo-American trust law might usefully contribute to other legal
systems. From this point of departure, Gallanis argues for the importance
of trust ﬁduciary law. Gallanis’s underlying purpose is to urge the
suitability of Anglo-American trust ﬁduciary law as a model for jurisdic-
tions that seek to assimilate the trust concept. To this end, Gallanis
advances two claims. First, to establish the signiﬁcance of trust ﬁduciary
law, he argues against what he perceives to be a mistaken analysis by
scholars of organizational law who emphasize the signiﬁcance of trust
law’s asset partitioning features and, in Gallanis’s view, needlessly ‘down-
play’39 the important contribution of trust ﬁduciary law. Second, having
established the importance of trust ﬁduciary law by rebutting those who
he thinks have challenged its importance, Gallanis points to the develop-
ment of trust law in France and China as illustrations of the potential for
Anglo-American trust ﬁduciary law to serve as a model for jurisdictions
lacking indigenous trust law.
A. Fiduciary law and asset partitioning
Gallanis’s overarching claim is that trust ﬁduciary law makes an import-
ant welfare contribution. He does not advance this claim with a theoret-
ical or empirical model, however. Instead he makes his afﬁrmative case
for the signiﬁcance of ﬁduciary law by way of a critical discussion of
recent work in the literature of organizational law as applied to trust law.
According to Gallanis, this work has mistakenly identiﬁed asset parti-
tioning as the essential contribution of trust law and wrongly disparaged
the contribution of ﬁduciary law as ‘relatively unimportant’.40
Gallanis takes as his foil a paper published in 1998 by Henry
Hansmann and Ugo Mattei.41 That paper is an early writing in what is
now a more mature corpus on asset partitioning by Hansmann and
various co-authors, principally Reinier Kraakman.42 The underlying
39 Gallanis, ‘The Contribution of Fiduciary Law’, Chapter 16 in this volume, p. 397.
40 Ibid., p. 390.
41 See Hansmann and Mattei, ‘Functions of Trust Law’, above, note 25. Hansmann and
Mattei published an abridged version of this paper as H. Hansmann and U. Mattei, ‘Trust
Law in the United States: A Basic Study of Its Special Contribution’ (1998) 46 American
Journal of Comparative Law 133.
42 See above, note 32.
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thesis of this body of work is that unlike ﬁduciary governance, which
does not affect the rights of third parties and hence in theory could be
replicated by contract, asset partitioning rules reorganize the rights of
third parties and therefore could not be replicated by contract. On this
view, the essential contribution of organizational law is asset partitioning,
with the term ‘essential’ used to describe that which is categorically
impossible without organizational law.
Gallanis is ‘troubled’ by Hansmann andMattei’s analysis.43 His discon-
tent is rooted in the observations that ﬁduciary law includes mandatory as
well as default rules; that some ﬁduciary rules are penalty defaults rather
than majoritarian or market-mimicking defaults; and that the nuance and
complexity of the web of rules and standards that comprise trust ﬁdu-
ciary law resist easy (read: low-transaction-cost) replication by private
agreement.
These observations and Gallanis’s broader claim that ﬁduciary law
makes a signiﬁcant contribution are surely correct. But I don’t see how
these points, with which I am certain Hansmann and his collaborators
would agree, undermine their claim of the categorical necessity of organ-
izational law to achieve asset partitioning. The Hansmann and Mattei
paper should be read in the context of the subsequent asset partitioning
literature that has elaborated on the theory,44 and against the transaction
costs ﬁduciary law literature that the asset partitioning work was meant to
enrich.45 Contextualized in this way, it seems evident that the aim of the
project by Hansmann and his collaborators was to identify the essential
core of organizational law that could not ever, even with an assumption
of zero transaction costs, be replicated by way of contract or other law.46
Accordingly, no language in those papers should be read to imply that
the authors believe that ﬁduciary law lacks real-world signiﬁcance.
Start with the point that ﬁduciary law includes mandatory as well as
default rules. As Gallanis acknowledges, Hansmann and his collaborators
do not deny that ﬁduciary law includes mandatory rules or that the
mandatory character of such rules serves useful policies.47 Rather their
point is that whatever the rules of governance supplied by ﬁduciary law,
whether those rules are default or mandatory, in theory such rules could
be replicated in a contract binding on those privy to the contract.
43 Gallanis, ‘Contribution of Fiduciary Law’, Chapter 16 in this volume, p. 392.
44 See above, note 32. 45 See text accompanying, above, note 34 and, below, note 60.
46 See Hansmann and Kraakman, ‘Role of Organizational Law’, above, note 19, 437.
47 Ibid., 437–8, 440.
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A similar answer can be given to the point that some ﬁduciary rules are
penalty defaults. Because such rules are meant to induce explicit con-
tracting, perforce there is no legal impediment to the parties replicating
the outcome of that negotiation by way of a contract rather than a trust
agreement.48 True, without the ﬁduciary law superstructure the
information-forcing beneﬁt would be lost. But this is to say that the
structure of ﬁduciary law usefully alters the negotiation dynamic in
setting the terms of the parties’ contract,49 not that private contract is
categorically impossible.
This brings us to the most substantial issue – transaction costs. To
illustrate the point that trust ﬁduciary law could be replicated by con-
tract, Hansmann and Mattei suggested that a prospective settlor and a
prospective trustee could execute a contract containing the relevant
sections of the Restatement of Trusts.50 Such a contract would be valid,
providing for powers and duties perfectly tracking those of trust law,
both default and mandatory. By contrast, the asset partitioning effect of
trust law, good against third parties not privy to the contract, could not
likewise be replicated. In this sense the asset partitioning effect of trust
law, but not the law of powers and duties, is essential.
Gallanis’s answer to the Restatement-incorporation heuristic, a
thought experiment, is to say that it is ‘extremely unrealistic’.51 Gallanis
explains: ‘While a settlor and prospective trustee could agree to the
current rules of trust ﬁduciary law, they are extremely unlikely to do
so.’52 This critique reﬂects a mistaken view of the project of Hansmann
and his collaborators. Their core claim, with which Gallanis appears to
agree, is that no rule of contract law (as compared to preferences or
transaction costs) would interfere with a prospective settlor and a pro-
spective trustee entering into a valid contract reproducing the entirety of
the current Restatement of Trusts and providing that those provisions are
to be interpreted in accord with the prevailing interpretation of the
Restatement. Such a contract would, by force of contract law, create
among the putative settlor, trustee and beneﬁciary the same rights, powers
and duties as under trust law – but there would be no third-party
48 Ibid., 437 (discussing rules that put the parties on notice of non-standard governance
provisions).
49 See Sitkoff, ‘Economic Structure’, above, note 3, 1049.
50 See Hansmann and Mattei, ‘Functions of Trust Law’, above, note 25, 447–8.
51 Gallanis, ‘Contribution of Fiduciary Law’, Chapter 16 in this volume, p. 395.
52 Ibid.
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asset partitioning.53 The Restatement-incorporation thought experiment
thus brings into sharp relief the categorical impossibility of achieving asset
partitioning without organizational law.
Gallanis’s real point, I think, is that even if ﬁduciary law pertains only
within the settlor–trustee–beneﬁciary triangle, such law makes important
contributions by protecting the unsophisticated (read: mandatory rules);
by altering the negotiating dynamic (read: penalty defaults); and, perhaps
most importantly, by reducing transaction costs (read: no need to dicker
over expensive, nuanced and complex rules). As is made clear in their
subsequent work, Hansmann and his collaborators agree. In the centre-
piece paper of this line of work, Hansmann and Kraakman argue that
‘aspects of organizational law other than asset partitioning are not
“essential” in the sense that workable substitutes for them [exist] else-
where in the law. This is not to say, however, that elements of organiza-
tional law other than asset partitioning are trivial and could be dispensed
with costlessly’.54 To the contrary, the ‘efﬁciencies offered by the various
detailed rules governing standard-form legal entities are important’.55
Nevertheless, asset partitioning ‘is the only important feature of [organ-
izational law] for which substitutes could not be crafted, at any price that
is even remotely conceivable, using just the basic tools of contract,
property, and agency law’.56
Reworking Gallanis’s critique of Hansmann and Mattei into an
explanation of trust ﬁduciary law rooted in transaction costs reconciles
Gallanis’s disagreement with Hansmann and his collaborators and makes
clearer the sensible core thesis of Gallanis’s essay. The cleavage between
Gallanis and the asset partitioning literature is not in the fact of transac-
tion costs in replicating ﬁduciary law by private agreement, but rather in
the magnitude of the costs involved in doing so. Hansmann and his co-
authors regard the contribution of organizational law in minimizing
such costs as being ‘not of the same order’57 as the contribution of
53 The beneﬁciary would become that species of contract party called a third-party donee
beneﬁciary. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts (St Paul: American Law Institute,
1981), §302, cmt. c.
54 Hansmann and Kraakman, ‘Role of Organizational Law’, above, note 19, 437.
55 In a subsequent writing, Hansmann suggested that the ability of the legislature simultan-
eously to modify the governance of all ﬁrms making use of one or another form of entity
is yet another cost saving from state-supplied standard-form entities. See H. Hansmann,
‘Corporation and Contract’ (2006) 8 American Law & Economics Review 1.
56 Hansmann and Kraakman, ‘Role of Organizational Law’, above, note 19, 437.
57 Ibid.
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organizational law in providing for asset partitioning. In response, Gal-
lanis says that Hansmann and Mattei’s ‘estimates of transaction costs
sometimes have the air of ipse dixit’.58 To illustrate, he points to the
expansive and discursive ﬁduciary provisions of the 2007 volume of the
Third Restatement of Trusts. Given the breadth and depth of those
provisions, Gallanis suggests that ‘the negotiation between a settlor and
a prospective trustee about all of these rules’ might well be ‘complex and
costly’.59
Viewed in this manner, Gallanis has undertaken to rehabilitate the
prior generation of ﬁduciary contractarians, most obviously Frank
Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, who argued that the primary function
of organizational law is to minimize transaction costs by providing a
menu of standard-form ﬁduciary contracts.60 Unlike Easterbrook and
Fischel, Gallanis does not state expressly that ﬁduciary terms are ‘public
goods’ that warrant public provision.61 But his argument about the
transaction costs of replicating by private agreement the nuances of
ﬁduciary law maps onto the Easterbrook and Fischel analysis quite
neatly.
The afﬁrmative case for the importance of trust ﬁduciary law should not
rest on a critical analysis of Hansmann and Mattei, but rather on a
functional explanation of the purpose of ﬁduciary law – that is, minimiz-
ing transaction costs in establishing terms that will suppress agency
costs.62 For persons wishing to create a trust, the existence of trust
ﬁduciary law provides a ready-made web of rules and standards to
govern the trustee’s exercise of the trustee’s discretionary powers of
administration. This web of rules includes a few that are mandatory, with
protective and categorical purposes, and a few that are penalty defaults, to
encourage disclosure and precise articulation of intention. But otherwise
the rules are market-mimicking defaults, which economizes on transac-
tion costs. Overall, trust ﬁduciary governance provides for expeditious
management of the trust property while minimizing the agency costs
arising from separating management (the trustee) and beneﬁcial
ownership (the beneﬁciary).
58 Gallanis, ‘Contribution of Fiduciary Law’, Chapter 16 in this volume, p. 394.
59 Ibid., p. 395.
60 See Easterbrook and Fischel, Economic Structure of Corporate Law, above, note 34,
pp. 34–5.
61 Ibid., p. 35.
62 See above, notes 3, 8 and 34, and text accompanying.
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B. Exporting ﬁduciary law abroad
Having undertaken to establish the importance of trust ﬁduciary law,
Gallanis points to the development of trust law in China and France as
illustrations of the potential for Anglo-American trust ﬁduciary law to
serve as a template for foreign jurisdictions interested in assimilating the
trust concept. Gallanis’s treatment is largely descriptive. He starts with
China and then moves to France.
The Chinese trust law, an adaptation of the common law trust for the
Chinese civilian system, includes many ﬁduciary rules that closely resem-
ble those of Anglo-American law. Gallanis schedules a host of examples
and explains that the similarity is deliberate. Gallanis also remarks upon
several differences, chieﬂy in the trustee’s duties to the settlor, delegation
by the trustee, and in impartiality among concurrent beneﬁciaries without
provision for impartiality when administering successive beneﬁcial inter-
ests. Gallanis points to the Chinese tradition of undivided ownership in
explanation for the focus on concurrent rather than successive interests.
But Gallanis does not say clearly whether the terms of the trust can provide
for successive interests and modify the duty of impartiality accordingly.
Gallanis celebrates the similarities between Chinese trust law and
Anglo-American trust ﬁduciary law. To Gallanis, the similarities evi-
dence how ‘well-developed and sophisticated, and suited to modern legal
practice’, is trust ﬁduciary law.63 Here it is noteworthy that Hansmann
and his collaborators agree. In the centrepiece paper of the asset parti-
tioning corpus, Hansmann and Kraakman took notice of ‘the fact that
most developed market economies provide for standard-form legal
entities that are similar in their basic features’.64 To Hansmann and
Kraakman, like Gallanis, this fact is evidence that the governance rules
of organizational law provide real-world beneﬁts such as economizing on
transaction costs.
A more interesting question is how to explain the differences between
Anglo-American and Chinese trust law. A common observation in the
economic literature on ﬁduciary law is that the precise contours of the
ﬁduciary obligation vary across ﬁduciary applications.65 This observation
about the doctrine ﬁts nicely the agency and transaction costs theory of
ﬁduciary law, in which the ﬁduciary obligation operates as an after-the-
63 Gallanis, ‘Contribution of Fiduciary Law’, Chapter 16 in this volume, p. 402.
64 Hansmann and Kraakman, ‘Role of Organizational Law’, above, note 19, 437.
65 See Sitkoff, ‘Economic Structure’, above, note 3, 1045.
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fact completion of what is necessarily an incomplete contract,66 because
agency problems vary across contexts. For example, the ﬁduciary obligation
in American trust law is generally stricter than the ﬁduciary obligation in
American corporate law. But those differences reﬂect the different contexts.
The agency problem in a family trust in which the beneﬁciaries have no exit
option and that is managed by a corporate ﬁduciary that cannot easily be
replaced differs signiﬁcantly from the agency problem in a large, publicly
traded corporation from which a shareholder can separate easily by selling
his shares in a thick securities market (the ‘Wall Street rule’).67
So a pressing question, not addressed in Gallanis’s discussion
(but elsewhere discussed by Frances Foster68), is why the Chinese author-
ities opted to deviate in certain respects from the Anglo-American model.
Do those deviations reﬂect material differences in the underlying agency
structure of the Chinese trust? Are such trusts predominantly managed
by professional ﬁduciaries? Is the Chinese system of adjudication more or
less reliable than the Anglo-American courts? The fact of the settlor’s
enforcement right and the absence of successive interests, for example,
would seem to bear on the nature and scope of the agency problem to be
ameliorated by the Chinese ﬁduciary law.
Gallanis’s treatment of the French trust ﬁduciary law ismore functional.
According to Gallanis, the French counterpart to the Anglo-American
trust, the ﬁducie, is meant for commercial purposes, not donative wealth
transfer. To Gallanis, the ﬁducie thus has a narrower purpose than the
Anglo-American trust, and this explains why its accompanying ﬁduciary
law is less detailed. But French lawyers have begun to urge that the ﬁducie
be used in family wealth transfer. If this idea comes to fruition, Gallanis
argues, then Anglo-American trust ﬁduciary law could provide a useful
template for expanding French ﬁduciary law accordingly.
The underlying insight is that Anglo-American trust ﬁduciary law
evolved out of long experience with the agency costs that arise in
separating management and beneﬁcial ownership in a donative trans-
fer ‘projected on the plane of time’.69 Gallanis’s point, which seems quite
66 F. H. Easterbrook and D. R. Fischel, ‘Contract and Fiduciary Duty’ (1993) 36 Journal of
Law & Economics 425, 432–4.
67 See R. H. Sitkoff, ‘Trust Law, Corporate Law, and Capital Market Efﬁciency’ (2003) 28
Journal of Corporation Law 565; see also S. M. Bainbridge, ‘The Case for Limited
Shareholder Voting Rights’ (2006) 53 UCLA Law Review 601, 619.
68 See F. H. Foster, ‘American Trust Law in a Chinese Mirror’ (2010) 94 Minnesota Law
Review 602, 621–50.
69 B. Rudden, ‘Book Review’ (1981) 44 Modern Law Review 610, 610.
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sensible, is that if the French are to make use of a transactional structure
for which we have centuries of experience, they would do well to examine
the governance regime we developed out of that experience.
But Gallanis’s focus on critiquing Hansmann and Mattei obscures
deeper questions. What are the commercial purposes to which the
French trust is put? Why hasn’t the agency problem in those applications
already strained ‘the thin ﬁduciary rules in French law’?70 American
corporate law, used routinely in commercial transactions, has a rather
detailed ﬁduciary law, including extensive rules on corporate opportun-
ities, executive compensation and ratiﬁcation of conﬂicted transactions.71
If agency costs in the commercial applications of the ﬁducie have been
minimized other than with ﬁduciary law, perhaps the same techniques
would be available in a donative application? Gallanis takes as a given that
commercial applications do not require much ﬁduciary law, but this
assumption does not follow from an immutable rule of organizational
dynamics.
Gallanis’s discussion of the function of ﬁduciary law is stimulating and
generative, and in my view largely sound. His discussion of Chinese and
French trust law is interesting and also impressive inasmuch as neither
jurisdiction uses English as its primary language. But Gallanis’s organiz-
ing motivation, critiquing Hansmann and Mattei, needlessly distracts
from the deeper issues to which his chapter points and from his sensible
core thesis that trust ﬁduciary law improves social welfare by minimizing
transaction costs.
IV Lee and the transplantation of trust law
In her chapter for this volume, Rebecca Lee takes the Chinese enactment
in 2001 of a systematic law of trusts as a natural experiment on the nature
and function of trusteeship. Because China follows the civilian tradition
of indivisible ownership, the Chinese assimilation of Anglo-American
trust law required replicating trust law’s governance and asset partition-
ing features without an express bifurcation of legal and beneﬁcial
ownership. The idea that animates Lee’s essay is that the resulting
Chinese law of trusts provides a window on the essential characteristics
of trusteeship. Lee’s thesis is that, to the extent the Chinese law
70 Gallanis, ‘Contribution of Fiduciary Law’, Chapter 16 in this volume, p. 404.
71 See, e.g., Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations, above, note
13, §§4.01–6.02 (1992).
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replicates the functional structure of the Anglo-American trust without
bifurcating legal and equitable ownership, such bifurcation is not an
essential feature of the trust.
Lee begins her analysis with the fascinating revelation that the creation
of a Chinese trust does not require a transfer of property to the trustee.
Instead, the settlor retains formal ownership of the property but entrusts
the management of the property to the trustee, subject to ﬁduciary
obligations that run to the beneﬁciaries and the settlor. The trustee might
take custodial possession of the trust property, but the settlor remains the
owner. In this respect, the arrangement resembles common law agency,
which likewise provides ﬁduciary governance without reorganizing own-
ership rights.
But the Chinese trust does reorganize ownership rights. Upon creation
of a Chinese trust, the settlor must separate the trust property from the
rest of his personal property. Crucially, this separateness is good against
third parties, or at least against the trustee’s personal creditors (more
on this qualiﬁcation later). To this extent, the Chinese trust is indeed a
functional replication of the Anglo-American trust. The Chinese trust
provides ﬁduciary management of identiﬁed property (the governance
function) that is separated from the personal property of the trustee even
against third parties (the asset partitioning function). The Chinese trust is
an organization; the Chinese law of trusts is organizational law.
To reconcile the Chinese trust’s deviance from the Anglo-American
requirement of a predicate conveyance of legal title to the trustee, Lee
conceptualizes trusteeship as an ofﬁce in which the holder of the ofﬁce
has management powers subject to ﬁduciary obligation. On this view,72
the Anglo-American bifurcation of legal and equitable title is a conveni-
ent but inessential mechanism to that end. The core internal feature of
the trust is the separation of the management of the trust property from
the beneﬁcial interest in that property, subject to a governance regime
(what Lee calls ‘control mechanisms’73). The Anglo-American trust uses
the artiﬁce of legal and equitable ownership not because the separation of
law and equity is categorically necessary, but because of the ready
accessibility of those concepts in the English legal tradition.
72 Suggested, for example, by Tony Honoré. See T. Honoré, ‘On Fitting Trusts into Civil
Law Jurisdictions’ (http://users.ox.ac.uk/~alls0079/chinatrusts2.PDF) 6; see also Sitkoff,
‘Agency Costs Theory’, above, note 2, 641–3; Gretton, ‘Trusts Without Equity’, above,
note 25, 617–18.
73 Lee, ‘Convergence and Divergence’, Chapter 17 in this volume, passim.
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In a jurisdiction such as China, which lacks the Anglo-American trad-
ition of separate law and equity courts, the separation of management and
beneﬁcial interest can be achieved through contractual imposition of a
governance regime that parallels the rights, powers and duties of Anglo-
American trust law. In this sense, the Chinese experience is something of a
natural experiment on Langbein’s analogy of the Anglo-American trust to a
third-party-beneﬁciary contract and Hansmann and his collaborator’s
argument that contract or contract-plus-agency is enough to replicate the
trust’s internal governance.74 Lee makes a compelling argument that the
Chinese trust captures the basic ﬁduciary governance regime of the Anglo-
American trust without the contortions of separate legal and equitable
ownership. As regards internal governance, the Chinese trust is thus a
victory for the contractarian model of trust ﬁduciary governance.
To be sure, Lee identiﬁes areas in which, to her way of thinking, the
Chinese trust governance regime is lacking and could be improved. She
would like to clarify the information rights of the beneﬁciary. She would
also like more certainty on the permissible scope of exoneration clauses,
such as in the Uniform Trust Code, now in force in about half the
American states.75 But these details are more in the nature of plumbing
than architecture. The familiar trust architecture of powers subject to
after-the-fact scrutiny for compliance with ﬁduciary standards of con-
duct is evident.76 And in Lee’s telling, that structure was produced by way
of a contractarian theory.
Yet the role of the Chinese settlor presents a puzzle. According to Lee,
the settlor can control the trustee’s management of the trust property,
and the beneﬁciary has no rights against the settlor. Lee sees this reserved
power in the settlor as being in tension with the English conception that,
ultimately, the trust property belongs to the beneﬁciary. In the English
tradition, illustrated by Saunders v. Vautier,77 the settlor relinquishes his
rights in the trust property, and ‘the dead hand continues to rule only by
sufferance of the beneﬁciar[ies]’.78 Without an express reservation of
rights, the settlor has no continuing interest in the trust property.79
74 See Langbein, ‘Contractarian Basis’, above, note 4; Hansmann and Mattei, ‘Functions of
Trust Law’, above, note 25; Hansmann and Kraakman, ‘Role of Organizational Law’,
above, note 19.
75 See UTC §1008. 76 See above, notes 4–7, and text accompanying.
77 (1841) Cr. & Ph. 240, 41 E.R. 482 (Ch.).
78 See Sitkoff, ‘Agency Costs Theory’, above, note 2, 662–3.
79 See P. Matthews, ‘The Comparative Importance of the Rule in Saunders v. Vautier’ (2006)
122 Law Quarterly Review 266.
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But the English view does not follow inexorably from immutable ﬁrst
principles of trust law. In the American tradition, illustrated by Claﬂin v.
Claﬂin80 and by the recognition of spendthrift trusts,81 the trust is a
conditional gift. The beneﬁciary takes his interest in the trust subject
to any restrictions imposed by the settlor. Constrained only by anti-
dead-hand public policy rules such as the rule against perpetuities and
the rule against capricious purposes, the American settlor is free to
impose conditions on the beneﬁciary’s enjoyment of the trust property.82
Viewed in this manner, the puzzle is not so much that the Chinese give
the settlor standing to enforce the trust, but rather the American reluc-
tance, outside of recent reform in trustee removal and in charitable trusts,
to do the same.83 As Langbein has suggested, settlor standing is consis-
tent with a contractarian understanding of trust governance,84 a point
I have elaborated on elsewhere from an agency costs perspective.85
In Lee’s telling, however, the settlor has more than an enforcement
right akin to the rights of a party to a third-party beneﬁciary contract.
The settlor ‘is also granted other extensive powers to intervene in the
trustee’s management of the trust property, including the power to
manage the trust property, and even the right to request the trustee
to adjust the methods of management’.86 To an American trust lawyer,
this passage evokes the contemporary revocable trust, which has come to
be conceptualized in American practice as a will substitute for post-
humous transfer outside of the probate system. Under modern American
trust law, the trustee of a revocable trust is subject to the control of the
settlor, and the trustee’s ﬁduciary duties run only to the settlor, for so
long as the settlor retains the power of revocation.87
The analogy to the revocable trust is imperfect. Nothing in Lee’s
discussion implies that the Chinese trust was meant to be a will substi-
tute. Even so, the analogy brings into focus the need to get a grip on the
purpose and uses of the Chinese trust. American trust law has fractured
80 20 N.E. 454 (Mass. 1889).
81 Compare Dukeminier, Sitkoff and Lindgren, Wills, Trusts, and Estates, above, note 12,
pp. 614–16, with Brandon v. Robinson, (1811) 18 Ves. Jr. 429, 34 E.R. 379 (Ch.).
82 See Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers, 3 vols. (St Paul:
American Law Institute, 1999–2011), §10.1, cmt. c.
83 See Restatement (Third) of Trusts, above, note 5, §94; UTC §§706(a), 405(c).
84 Langbein, ‘Contractrian Basis’, above, note 4, 664.
85 Sitkoff, ‘Agency Costs Theory’, above, note 2, 666–9.
86 Lee, ‘Convergence and Divergence’, Chapter 17 in this volume, p. 417.
87 See Restatement (Third) of Trusts, above, note 5, §74; UTC §603(a).
450 robert h. sitkoff
into three distinct branches: (1) business trusts, now dominated by the
Delaware statutory business trust, a juridical entity with capacity to sue,
be sued, and hold property in its own name;88 (2) revocable trusts, a will
substitute over which the settlor remains in control and in which the
beneﬁciary has no rights; and (3) irrevocable trusts, the traditional trust
in which a segregated pool of assets is held by a trustee subject to a
ﬁduciary governance regime for the beneﬁt of one or more beneﬁciar-
ies.89 Lee’s discussion, in particular her worry about the lack of clarity in
the Chinese law respecting exoneration clauses, implies that the Chinese
trust is not a will substitute but rather a business trust or a donative
irrevocable trust.
The revocable trust analogy also points to the question of whether the
settlor’s creditors have recourse against the trust property as in the
American revocable trust.90 The American rule follows from the role of
the revocable trust as a will substitute; in truth, in a revocable trust the
trust property still belongs to the settlor. Lee’s discussion, including her
reference to a ‘separate trust patrimony’ and the rules requiring the
settlor to segregate the trust property,91 implies that the settlor’s creditors
cannot reach the trust property. But Lee does not address this issue
expressly. Instead, following Hansmann and Mattei’s analysis of asset
partitioning in trust law, which Lee calls the ‘external aspect’ of the
trust,92 Lee focuses on the inability of the trustee’s personal creditors to
reach the trust property.
Lee’s focus on asset partitioning for the trustee is incomplete. In the
Chinese trust, the settlor, not the trustee, is the technical owner of the
trust property. Recall that at the outset of Lee’s essay, she tells us that in
the Chinese trust there is no required conveyance of the trust property to
the trustee. Instead the settlor remains the owner, subject to a duty to
keep the trust property separate from the settlor’s other property. The
asset partitioning literature that Lee follows emphasizes the separateness
from the trustee’s personal obligations because in the Anglo-American
88 See Delaware Statutory Trust Entity Act §3804 (2011); Uniform Statutory Trust Entity
Act §§307–8 (2009); see also R. H. Sitkoff, ‘Trust as “Uncorporation”: A Research
Agenda’ [2005] University of Illinois Law Review 31.
89 In this taxonomy, which I intend to develop in future work, I am putting to the side the
constructive trust, which is a remedy, and the resulting trust, which is an equitable
reversionary interest.
90 See Restatement (Third) of Trusts, above, note 5, §25, cmt. e; UTC §505.
91 Lee, ‘Convergence and Divergence’, Chapter 17 in this volume, p. 424.
92 Ibid., pp. 424, 427.
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tradition the trustee is the legal owner of the trust property. This is the
feature of trust law – in effect, the splitting the trustee into two separate
persons – that cannot be replicated by mere contract. But if the settlor
and not the trustee owns the trust property, then the locus of the
partitioning or separateness issue shifts to the settlor, and the question
is whether the settlor becomes in effect two separate persons.
Lee’s discussion of the Chinese assimilation of the trust concept is
provocative and interesting. Although China follows the civilian tradition
of indivisible ownership, the Chinese were able to replicate the ﬁduciary
governance of Anglo-American trust law by direct imposition of rights,
powers and duties that parallel those of Anglo-American trust law. In
this sense, the Chinese experience lends support to the contractarian
model of trust law. But we also ﬁnd in the Chinese trust the existence of
the asset partitioning rules that separate organizational law, of which
trust law is a species, from mere contract law. Although Lee emphasizes
the Chinese replication of Anglo-American trust governance, her essay
suggests an equally interesting replication of asset partitioning, though
this point is not as well developed and is lacking with respect to the
settlor’s continued ownership of the trust property and the rights of the
settlor’s personal creditors.
V Conclusion
Organizational law supplies a set of contractarian rules, some of a
ﬁduciary character, that provide for the governance of the organization.
These are the rules that provide for the powers and duties of the
managers and the rights of the beneﬁcial owners. Organizational law
also supplies a set of proprietary rules that provide for asset partitioning.
These are the rules that provide for the separation of the property of the
organization from the property of the organization’s managers, beneﬁcial
owners and other insiders. Because trust law follows this pattern, supply-
ing both ﬁduciary governance and asset partitioning, the law of trusts is a
species of organizational law.93
The chapters for this volume by Thomas P. Gallanis and by Rebecca
Lee both emphasize the importance of the ﬁduciary governance rules of
trust law. Gallanis argues that trust ﬁduciary law makes an important
contribution. I have suggested that this contribution can be understood
93 See Sitkoff, ‘Agency Costs Theory’, above, note 2, 627–34.
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primarily as minimizing transaction costs through provision of a
standard-form contract suited to the agency problem underlying the
trust structure. Fiduciary law also supplies mandatory rules that serve
protective and categorization functions, and penalty default rules that are
meant to alter the parties’ negotiation dynamic. Lee argues that the
Chinese experience with assimilating the trust, in which the Chinese
have replicated Anglo-American trust ﬁduciary law without separate
concepts of law and equity, shows that the governance rules but not legal
and equitable ownership are part of the irreducible core of trusteeship.
I have suggested several follow-up questions for Lee, in particular about
the nature of asset partitioning in the Chinese trust given the settlor’s
continued ownership of the trust property.
More than ﬁfteen years ago, John Langbein suggested that ‘[t]rust is
a hybrid of contract and property, and acknowledging contractarian
elements does not require disregarding property components whose
convenience abides’.94 The claim that runs through this chapter, a
commentary on those by Gallanis and Lee, is that such hybrids are
properly regarded as organizations. Trust law is organizational law.
94 Langbein, ‘Contractarian Basis’, above, note 4, 669.
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